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• '  
SUBSTANTIAL CONFUSION ABOUT 
"SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS"t 
Chad Flanders* 
As the Supreme Court rev1s1ts the clash between religious belief 
and the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in the Zubik 1 case, it is worth mull-
ing over a key phrase in the law that governs that clash: '·substantial bur-
den." According to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the 
government must-provided it does not meet certain other conditions, 
such as showing a compelling interest-make an accommodation if it 
places a ''substantial burden'' on a person's religious exercise.2 If the 
question in the Hobby Lobby case was whether a for-profit corporation 
could be a ''person" that ''exercised religion,"3 the question the Court 
now faces is whether the government has in fact ''substantially bur-
dened" some religious non-profits in trying to accommodate their objec-
tion to the contraceptive mandate.4 
But what is a ''substantial burden"? Or to put it another way, what 
makes a burden substantial? What follows is my best effort to provide 
clarity-in the form of a primer-as to the meaning of "substantial bur-
den" under RFRA. 
I. WHAT IS A ''BURDEN" ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF?
The answer to this question seems to be fairly straightforward, given 
the Supreme Court's case law: a religious belief or believer is "burdened" 
when the government puts some kind of pressure on someone to act con-
• Associate Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. 
t Thanks to William Baude. John lnazu and Chris Lund for comments and conversations on 
earlier drafts, and tu Joe Welling, whu offered his usual expert proofreading. Michael Dorf saved me 
from numerous errors on a previous iteration of this essay. This paper huilds on and updates my essay. 
/ns11hst11111ial Burdens, availahlc at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm'/ahstracUd=2727423. 
I. Zuhik v. 13urwell. 578 U . S . _  (2016). 
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bh-1 (West 2015). 
3. Burwell v. Hohby Lohhy Stores. Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); see generally THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Chad Flanders, Zoe Rohinson, & Micah Schwamman, eds .. 2016). 
4. Zuhik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015) (granting certiorari on the question of the govern-
ment's accommodation, appealing from Geneva Cull. v. Sec'y U.S. Dept. of Health & Human 
Services, 778 F.3d 422 (3rd Cir. 2015)). 
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trary to his religious beliefs.' This idea of "putting pressure on'' is im-
portant because it distinguishes RFRA's sense of burden from what we 
might otherwise think is a burden. Many things can burden your exercise 
of religion because they make it harder for you to practice your belief, 
yet they would not count as being "burdens'' (let alone "substantial'' 
ones) under RFRA. 
Suppose the government shuts down the road you usually take to 
get to church. Or suppose it rains that day and the traffic is very bad. 
Both of these "burden'' your religious belief because it will take more 
than the usual effort for you to exercise your religion: they are burdens 
because they make things harder for you. But neither of these things 
would count as a burden under RFRA-certainly not the latter, because 
it does not involve government action, but not even the former.c, A sub-
stantial burden is not just any "inconvenience on religious exercise;" it 
must involve some sort of direct or indirect coercion by the state.7 Not all 
bad things happening to you involve being coerced in some way. 
This understanding of burden is a major lesson of Lyng v. Northwest 
Indian Cemetery Protective Association.  In Lyng, the government 
planned on putting a road through a forest that was sacred to a Native 
American tribe. The tribe sued but lost because, while destroying the 
forest was certainly a bad thing for the tribe and a hindrance to them be-
ing able practice their religion, it did not put pressure on them to violate 
their beliefs or change their religion. The action of the government was 
not of the form, "do this, or else pay a price.''9 It is this element of coer-
cion or pressure, essentially a threat by the government against you to 
make you act against your beliefs, which defines something as being a 
''burden'' under RFRA.m 
II. WHAT DOES THE ADJECTIVE ''SUBSTANTIAL'' MODIFY?
If "burden'' means putting some pressure on a plaintiff, we have to 
consider what "substantial" brings to the mix. I prefer framing the ques-
tion as: what does "substantial'' modify? Here we should be careful. 
There are at least two things that "substantial" could modify. First, it 
5. See, e.g .. Hobhh: v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (not-
ing that a �uhstantial burden is fuund when there is "suhstanlial pressure on an adhen:nt to modify his 
behavior and to violate his hclicfs") (internal citation omitted). 
6. Things might he different if the government had purposely destroyed the road, just to get at 
your religion. But I think this would still be the hasis or something other than a RFRA claim (perhaps 
a claim under the free exercise clause). 
7. Midmh Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004). 
8. 485 U.S. 439 (1988); see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
9. Sherherl v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (slating that a suhstanlial hurden is when an 
in<lividual is made lo "choose hclween following the precepL� of her religion and forfeiting hcnefits. on 
the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion . . .  on the other"). 
10. Lyng. 485 U.S. at 450 (noting that a suhslanlial hurden exists when the government action 
has "[a] tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious hclicfs"). l l  follows. too, 
that merely heing offended hy something the government docs is not enough lo count ,L� a burden. 
While "hcing offcndt.:<l" may make it har<ler for you lo practice your n.:ligion, if the government is not 
pulling you to II choice, then there is no "hur<len." 
' 
,. 
Spring] SUBSTANTIAL CONFUSION 29 
could be that the government has to put substantial or heavy pressure on 
you to violate your religious beliefs. But it could also be that the gov-
ernment has to pressure you to violate your religious beliefs in some sub-
stantial or serious way. For example, maybe the government is asking you 
to violate a particularly important tenet of your religion, not just some 
discretionary one. 
In other words, "substantial" could either refer to the quantum of 
pressure you are facing to violate your beliefs-is it a lot or a little? Or it 
could refer to how serious an imposition on your religion the government 
action has to be-is  it a big intrusion or little one? The statute taken as a 
whole, I admit, could be interpreted as applying "substantial'' to modify 
both pressure and religious belief. That is, "substantial burden" under 
RFRA might mean you face substantial pressure to substantially violate 
your religion-that the pressure is strong and affects a really important 
or vital part of your beliefs. 11 
Some courts have insisted that substantial refers to the degree or 
scope of the supposed religious violation, viz., that the push for you to 
give up or change your religious beliefs should not just be something that 
affects a minor or optional part of your belief system, but should really 
cut into the core of your religious practice. As a result, these courts have 
held that slight infringements-an observant prisoner misses a couple of 
religious meals, for instance-do not count because they are "de mini-
mis.''12 It may be a burden, but it is not a "substantial one'' if it only re-
quires a slight deviation from or a slight violation of your religious prac-
tice; even if there is a lot of pressure on you to make that deviation or 
commit that violation. 
The better view is that "substantial" applies only to the quantum of 
pressure that is put on a person to violate his religious beliefs-that 
means any part of his religious beliefs, and for any amount of time. This 
is true for both a statutory reason and a philosophical one. The statutory 
reason is that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA)-which retroactively applies to RFRA's definition of reli-
gion-explained that an exercise of religion should mean ''any exercise 
of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of reli-
gious belief."13 If ''substantial burden'' means something like ''burdening 
11. In other words, therc could he LARGE pressure lo make you violate your helicfs in a
SMALL way (I lhrealcn lo kill you if you do not do some minor and optional acl of n:ligious devo-
tion); there could be SMALL pn:ssure lo make you violate your beliefs in a LARGE way (I will line 
you a penny unkss you desecrate your house of worship); and then: could he LARGE prcssurcs for 
LARGE violations. Arc all of !hes.: "substantial hurdcns" or just some of lhcm'/ 
12. See. e.g .• Norwood v. Strada, 249 F. App'x 269,272 (3rd Cir. 2007) ("The issue here. howo:v-
cr, is much more circumscribed; ii is whclher a short denial of such a [religious] diet during an o:mer-
gency lockdown was a 'suhstantial hurden,' or a mac do: minimis intrusion."); see also id. (collccting 
cases). 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000): see also Burwell v. Hohby Lobby Stores. Inc .. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2761-62 (2014) (discussing the enactment of RLUIPA). 
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a central part of the person's religious belief system," then this is plainly 
ruled out by the statute. 14 
On a more theoretical level, courts have traditionally been, and 
should now be, reluctant to determine whether or not a violation of this 
or that part of someone's religion is "substantial" or "'insubstantial.'' Can 
a court really say that missing one or two religious meals is "de minimis'' 
and therefore not a big deal ( or an "insubstantial burden")? But this sec-
ond-guessing is exactly what the courts would have to do if we interpret-
ed '"substantially burden'' to mean '"cause someone to violate an import-
ant or major part of his belief system." How are courts supposed to know 
whether or not the law is pressuring a person to violate an important or 
unimportant part of her belief system, or compromising her belief mas-
sively or only slightly, without undertaking a searching and (for that rea-
son) problematic theological inquiry? What to one person might be a 
slight or '"attenuated" imposition on her religious practice may be to an-
other a very serious cost. 
Courts cannot and should not have to adjudicate this point. They 
should instead assess whether there is a large amount of pressure ('"sub-
stantial" pressure) being put on the person to violate her beliefs. The 
plaintiff still must show that the government is pressuring her to violate 
some part of her religion, 15 but she should not have the burden of show-
ing that what the government is pressuring her to do makes up an im-
portant, central, or substantial part of her religious exercise. Absent a 
finding that the plaintiff is being insincere, the issue of whether the law is 
affecting a really important part of his or her religion should largely go 
unchallenged. After all, if it was not important, why sue in the first place? 
I l l .  WHAT MAKES THE PRESSURE ON BELIEF "SUBSTANTIAL"? 
The main use of the word "substantial" in the Hobby Lobby opin-
ion itself refers correctly to the quantum of pressure the person faces to 
violate some part of her religious belief system. The burden on Hobby 
Lobby to violate its religious beliefs is "'substantial,'' the Court ruled, in 
part because if Hobby Lobby did not cover contraceptives it would have 
to pay a hefty tax bill-upwards of $15 million dollars a year. 16 Or, if 
Hobby Lobby instead dropped insurance coverage and its employees 
qualified for subsidies on the state exchanges, they might have to pay $26 
14. For a good statement of this point, sec E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. Scbelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 
743. 764 (S.D. Tex. 2013) rev'd sub nom. E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. Burwell. 793 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 
2015). 
15. See Hcrnamh:z v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680. 699 (1989) ("We do, however, have doubt� whether 
the alleged burden imposed by the deduction disallowancc on the Scicnlologists' practices is a substan-
tial one. Ndther the payment nor the n:ceipt of taxes is forbidden by the Scientology faith generally. 
and Scientology docs not proscribe the payment of taxes in connection with auditing or training ses-
sions specifically."). 
16. See Hobby Lobby. 134 S. Ct. al 2757. 
.,. .
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million in penalties. 17 Thus, it appears that a large fine counts as a sub-
stantial pressure under RFRA, and that seems right. 
This leaves open many questions. For example, is there some point 
at which a fine would not be enough to count as "substantial"? If the fine 
were just $50 dollars, would this be insufficient pressure on a relatively 
well-off for-profit company? The logic of Justice Alito's opinion points in 
this direction, but other considerations may lead us to say that any fine 
could be "substantial.'' We did not know the amount of the welfare bene-
fits Mrs. Sherbert risked giving up in Sherbert v. Verner/8 but it certainly 
was not in the millions. Additionally, in w;sconsin v. Yoder, it seems that 
the Amish might have only been assessed a $50 fine if they failed to send 
their kids to public school; were these burdens therefore "insubstan-
tial''?19 
It would be great if we could get more clarity here. Unfortunately, 
for reasons I spell out in the next section, it does not look like this will be 
much of an issue in the Zubik litigation,211 so clarification likely will not be 
forthcoming. 
IV. How DOES THIS APPLY TO THE ZUBIK CASE? 
I will be rather brief and perfunctory in how I see the above primer 
as helping to illuminate the latest case. 
1. Many appellate courts have seen this as a "no burden'' case along
the lines of Lyng. This is incorrect. The government may no longer
be requiring the plaintiffs to pay for contraception, but they are re-
quiring them to indicate that they want an accommodation. This 
puts them to a choice: the plaintiffs either have to affirmatively no-
tify the government that they want an accommodation or not cover
contraception and pay the fines. There is a burden here, because
the government is pressuring them to do something- ''do this, or 
else pay a price." It is not just a case of plaintiffs objecting to some-
thing they do not like that the government is doing by itself to 
someone else, and which makes it harder for them to practice their
religion. They are objecting to something in particular (for example,
having to sipn a form) that they are being forced to do and do not 
want to do.2 · 
2. The plaintiffs, nonetheless, have to show that notifying the gov-
ernment that they want an accommodation is a violation of their
sincerely held religious beliefs-not a violation of an important or 
17. See id. 
18. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
19. ·•·Whoever violates this section . . .  may he lined not less than $5 nor more than $50 ur im-
prisoned not more than 3 months or hoth.'"' 406 U.S. 2115, 207 (1972) (4uoting WIS. STAT.§ 118.15 
( 1969)). 
20. Zuhik v. Burwell. 578 U . S . _  (�016). 
21. "So when Wheaton Colk:ge tells us that it is hcing 'forccd" to allow •use' of its health plans lo 
cover emcrgcncy contraceptives. ii is wrong. It"s being ·forced' only to notify its insurers . . . .  · 
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added). 
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central belief, but a religious belief they hold. I assume they will be 
able to do this under some theory of complicity; and the courts 
should defer to the plaintiffs' assessment of their beliefs, if they are 
sincere. I gather that the complicity theory goes something like this, 
''we do not want to have any part in how this contraceptive system 
is being run, even if we are not in any way financially liable. We are 
tainted by our participation-which may seem small to you, but is a 
big deal to us.'' 
3. If the fine they have to pay is roughly the same as the Hobby
Lobby fine, or even less, then there is not only a burden on the 
plaintiffs, but a ''substantial" one. This, incidentally, is why the 
Court will not have to confront the question of how big a fine there
has to be for the pressure to be "substantial" - the fine here is plen-
ty big. 
4. Of course, this does not mean the plaintiffs will win, only that 
they have not lost at the first stage, viz., the stage at which they
have to show their religious belief has been substantially burdened.
It has. 
V .  SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE ORAL ARGUMENT AND 
DECISION IN ZUBIK 
In the Zubik oral argument, the Solicitor General strained to avoid 
any questions about substantial burden-leading Justice Kennedy at one 
point to ask if he was in fact conceding that there was a substantial bur-
den.22 General Verrilli insisted he was not, but one could see why he was 
trying so hard to skirt the issue. Talking about how a religious believer's 
beliefs are not being seriously affected when the believer says they are is 
hard, especially when you admit up front that you are not questioning 
the believer's sincerity. You need to figure out a rule that says when a 
belief is important and affected enough that the believer's ability to prac-
tice his belief is "substantially" compromised-and you have to say that 
you can tell, better than the believer can, when this is the case. 
My analysis counsels that courts should avoid taking the bait; in-
stead they should move on to the analysis of whether there is a compel-
ling governmental interest and a least restrictive means. Do not get me 
wrong, this kind of analysis is hard. But it is, if there is such a thing, a 
good kind of hard.23 It is the kind of hard that courts are good, or good 
22. Transcript of Oral Argument al 45, Zuhik ,,, Hurwcll. 578 U . S . _  (2016) (No. 14-1418) 
("JUSTICE KENNEDY: And is ii fair fur me lo infer from the way you open your remarks that you 
conce<lc that there is a suhstantial burden here? And the question then is what is a permissible ac-
commodation'/ What's the least restrictive alternative'/ Do you concede that thcn.:'s a substantial bur-
den'/"). 
23. The somewhat surprisin� order in the case docs not change my undcrslan<lin_g of how the 
ca�c should be decided. See Order. Zubik v. Rurwdl, 578 11. S. _ _  (2016) (No. 14-1418) (filed Mar. 
29, 20 I ti). What the order asks. in short. is whether there is some other least restrictive means that 
docs not burden the plaintiffs at all. This is pn.:cisdy the threshold question of whether there is a bur-
den on the plaintiffs (of the sort that pressures them to do something "or else"), or just something 
happening that the plaintiffs do not like or find olfcnsive. If the Court linds that there is an alternative 
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enough, at handling. They are hard questions of secular governmental 
policies and ends, and whether and how the government can achieve 
them. Courts should avoid questions that involve questions that are the 
bad kind of hard-the hard that involves trying to figure out what some-
one else's religion means, and telling them when they are or are not suf-
fering a '·substantial burden." And nothing in the Court's evasive deci-
sion in Zubik24 changes this fact: they have only put off the decision for a 
further day. The hard questions they have yet to tackle still remain; and 
the hard questions courts should never tackle are rightly put off, and 
should be put off indefinitely.2.1 
means ror the government lo achieve its compelling interest, which involves no burden on the plain-
tiffs, then the plaintiffs should win and the government should adopt that alternative means. Ir there is 
a hurden. however, then the Court should go on to decide whether the compelling interest in this case 
is compelling enough. Again, neither path requires the Court to explore whether the burden is "sub-
stantial" or not. They only need lo consider whether there is a hurden in the first place. 
24. Zuhik v. Burwell. 578 U . S . _  (2016). 
25. I have analy7cd the Zubik opinion in more detail in a post on SCOTUShlog. See Chad 
Flanders, Srm1wsi11m: /1110 rhe Weeds, SCOTUSBLOG (l\fay lo. 2111h, 3:04 PM), hltp://www.�cotu,hlo!! 
.c, ,m/2016/0�/s.�mp, 1,Hun-inlo-thc-wccds/. 

